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Abstract
This paper develops an original mean-variance model able to capture the
disposition of the parties towards both standard risk and ambiguity. Ambiguity
arises when the causal link between conduct and harm is not univocal, as is
frequently the case with toxic torts. Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion tend
to have a similar impact on optimal liability rules if greater care reduces the
ambiguity perceived by the parties, i.e. if safety and predictability go hand in
hand. Strict liability dominates negligence when the injurer has lower degrees of
risk and ambiguity aversion than the victim and can formulate less ambiguous
estimates of the probability of harm. The reverse result only holds under stronger
conditions.
Keywords: negligence vs. strict liability, scientific uncertainty, ambiguity,
toxic torts.
JEL Code: K13
∗Correspondence to: Luigi A. Franzoni, Department of Economics, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126
Bologna, Italy.
†This paper is the first part of a larger project originally titled “Liability law and uncertainty
spreading.” I am grateful to Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci for valuable help. Thanks also
to S. Bose, A. Daughety, M. Faure, G. Dari Mattiacci, D. Heine, E. Langlais, J. Reinganum, F. Parisi,
S. Romagnoli, S. Shavell, O. Somech, L. Visscher, A. Tabbach, U. Schweizer, and seminar participants
in Bologna, Bonn, Ghent, Stockholm (EALE), Standford (ALEA), and Tel Aviv for constructive
comments.
1
Liability rules allocate risks across individuals. As such, they serve both an incentive
function (encouraging parties to take care) and an allocative function (uncertainty
sharing). Optimal liability law design accordingly involves a difficult trade-off, in which
the ability of the parties to take measures to avoid harm is balanced against their
tolerance for uncertainty.
In this paper, I focus on uncertainty that arises when parties: i) do not know for sure
whether harm will occur or not (“risk”), and ii) do not know for sure the probability
with which harm will occur (“ambiguity”). The latter type of uncertainty is of special
relevance for toxic torts, in which the connection between the injurer’s conduct and
the plaintiff’s injury (the probability of harm) is often subject to scientific uncertainty
due to our scant knowledge of the biological mechanisms for disease development.1 The
ever expanding scope of the uncertainty brought about by technological progress poses
a serious challenge to liability law and safety policy in general.
In the model, when agents assess preventive measures available (choice of care),
they consider the ability of these measures to reduce the mean probability of harm as
well the accuracy by which this reduction can be achieved. Specifically, I assume that
parties formulate beliefs about the probability of harm given the preventive measures
adopted. If these beliefs are dispersed (say, the probability of harm can range within
an interval), the preventive measure generates ambiguity. In line with Ellsberg (1961)
and an impressive body of empirical evidence, I assume that people are averse both to
risk and ambiguity.2 Ambiguity aversion is modelled according to the smooth model of
Klibanoff et al. (2005), which posits that parties are averse to mean preserving spreads
of the beliefs.
1Scientific uncertainty has been a distinguishing trait of leading toxic torts, including asbestos,
Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, DES, and Bendectin (see, for instance, Geistfeld (2001), and references
therein). In risk assessment, a distinction is normally drawn between “model” and “parameter” un-
certainty. The first concerns the explanatory model, the latter only some parameters of the model (see
for instance InstituteofMedicine (2014)). This paper deals with both types of uncertainty.
2The literature, both theoretical and empirical, on ambiguity aversion is huge. Good surveys are
provided by Wakker (2010), Etner et al. (2012) and Gilboa and Marinacci (2013). In the medical field
it has been shown that ambiguity regarding the effectiveness of health-protective measures, including
cancer screening tests, makes people less willing to adopt them (see Reyna et al. (2015) and references
therein).
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In order to overcome the complexities of the analysis - risk aversion alone is enough
to cloud any intuition - I rely on local approximations of the willingness of the parties to
bear uncertainty.3 This allows me to obtain an original mean-variance model in which
the premium that an individual is willing to pay to avoid uncertainty is the sum of a risk
premium and an ambiguity premium. The risk premium depends on the variance of the
mean probability of harm, while the ambiguity premium depends on the variance of the
beliefs, as in Maccheroni et al. (2013). On the basis of this convenient simplification, I
am able to characterize the optimal features of the Negligence and Strict Liability rules,
and to clearly identify the conditions under which either rule is socially preferable.
Section 2 deals with the optimal design of Strict Liability and Negligence. Neither
rule produces the fully efficient outcome. Under Strict Liability, the double goal of
setting incentives and allocating the uncertainty burden are assigned to a single instru-
ment, namely damages. I show that optimal damages are less than fully compensatory.
They increase with the degree of risk aversion of the victim, while their increases with
his degree of ambiguity aversion if greater care reduces the variance of his beliefs.
Under Negligence, the injurer pays damages only if she does not meet the standard
of care set by the courts. In equilibrium, the injurer will meet the standard and thus
avoid liability. This implies that the uncertainty burden will be inefficiently placed
on one side only (the victim). I show that the optimal standard of care is higher if
the degree of risk aversion of the victim is higher. The optimal standard rises with the
degree of ambiguity aversion of the victim if, and only if, care reduces the variance of his
beliefs. In other words, adoption of those prevention measures should be discouraged
at the margin, that reduce the mean probability of harm but increase the ambiguity
borne by the victim (the ability of these measures to reduce the probability of harm is
uncertain). In this sense, the cautionary approach underpinned by ambiguity aversion
does not necessarily push for the use of “safer” (in expected terms) technologies: the
predictability/reliability of these technologies matters too.
In Section 2.3, I address the main issue in liability design, namely which party
3These approximations allow for an analysis of liability policy independent of income levels, a
convention that comports with current practice and standard cost-benefit analysis.
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should bear the loss. Strict Liability dominates Negligence when the injurer is less
averse to uncertainty (either because of lower degrees of risk and ambiguity aversion
or because she is able to formulate more precise estimates of the probability of harm).
The reverse does not hold true: if courts can award under-compensatory damages,
Strict Liability may dominate Negligence even if the victim is less averse to uncertainty
than the injurer. Negligence definitely dominates if the degrees of risk and ambiguity
aversion of the victim are sufficiently small or if the harm is dispersed on a large number
of individuals. In the latter case, Negligence allows for better uncertainty spreading.
These results hold for both unilateral and bilateral accidents where the defence under
Strict Liability is contributory Negligence (Section 3).
Literature review. The relative performance of Strict Liability vis-a-vis Negligence has
long been debated. Under uncertainty-neutrality, both rules can provide parties with
an incentive to adopt the efficient level of care. The comparison between Strict Lia-
bility and Negligence must then account for additional factors, such as activity levels,
judicial errors, judgment-proofness, and litigation expenditure.4 If the assumption of
uncertainty neutrality is dropped, the disposition of the parties towards uncertainty
becomes paramount and the two liability rules are no longer equivalent.
In his classic analysis of liability design under risk aversion, Shavell (1982) shows
that Strict liability is preferable when the injurer is risk-neutral and the victim risk-
averse, while Negligence is preferable in the opposite case.5 Beyond these polar cases,
no further conclusion can be reached because attitudes towards risk themselves depend
on the liability rule adopted. Another important result, found in Shavell (1982), is that
optimal damages under Strict Liability are under-compensatory.6 This result holds in
my (smooth) uncertainty model, but it does not hold when the beliefs of the parties
4See Shavell (2007), Schaefer and Mueller-Langer (2009), and references therein.
5Other investigations of optimal liability design under risk aversion include Greenwood and Ingene
(1978), deriving optimal risk sharing rules using a local approach, and Graff Zivin and Small (2003),
dealing with bilateral accidents with side payments under CRRA utilities. Nell and Richter (2003)
address the case of dispersed harm under CARA utilities. They prove that negligence is approximately
efficient when the number of victims goes to infinity, if care is constrained above. Langlais (2010)
investigates optimal risk allocation for perfectly correlated harms under RDEU.
6This result derives from the basic insight of Mossin (1968) that a minimal amount of self-insurance
is optimal when insurance premia include a loading factor (i.e., when they are not actuarially fair).
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are biased (see Appendix A6).
A closely related work is the pioneering contribution of Teitelbaum (2007), who uses
Choquet’s Expected Utility theory to account for the injurer’s aversion to ambiguity
in a unilateral accident model. Teitelbaum posits that when parties lack confidence
on the probability of harm they make decisions taking an average of the best outcome
(no accident), the worst outcome (accident) and the expected utility of the accident
prospect. If they display “pessimism” they attach greater weight to the worst outcome,
if they display “optimism,” they attach greater weight to the best outcome.7 Teitelbaum
assumes that the court and the victim are immune to ambiguity and investigates the
impact of the injurer’s ambiguity aversion on her choice of care, which tends to be
biased. He shows that Negligence tends to outperform Strict Liability, since under
the latter the injurer has to make a finer decision (what level of care to take, rather
than whether to meet the standard or not). In this sense, Negligence allows for better
“insulation” of non-rational behavior.8
In my model, the uncertainty about the probability of harm is ingrained in the
prevention technology: it cannot be resolved. As such, it affects both the injurer
and the victim. Furthermore, ambiguity aversion is taken as a rational response to
probabilistic uncertainty, rather than a cognitive bias. As originally noted by Ellsberg
(1961), ambiguity aversion is not a mistake that agents would be willing to correct once
noted. Instead, ambiguity aversion is the manifestation of a rational doubt about the
reliability of subjective beliefs (the probability estimates).9 If one takes this approach
and includes ambiguity costs in welfare evaluations, then the relevant question becomes
not how to force people to behave as if they were ambiguity-neutral, but rather how
to allocate the loss when people have to bear the cost of uncertainty.
In the last decades, the study of ambiguity has been a hot topic in decision theory.
Among the several models that have been proposed, the smooth model has proved
particularly fruitful, since it provides an intuitive interpretation of ambiguity that can
7Optimism and pessimism can also be embedded in my smooth model, see Appendix A6.
8See Jolls and Sunstein (2006) for a broad view on insulation and debiasing approaches in be-
havioural law and economics.
9See the convincing arguments of Gilboa and Marinacci (2013), and references therein.
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encompass most other approaches (see Etner et al. (2012)). Treich (2010) shows that
smooth ambiguity aversion increases the willingness to pay to reduce mortality risks.
Snow (2011) and Alary et al. (2013) analyze the investment in self-protection and self-
insurance of ambiguity-averse agents. The effect of ambiguity on self-protection turns
out to depend on the relationship between effort and beliefs. If the effort to self-protect
is relatively less efficacious for more pessimistic beliefs, ambiguity reduces the marginal
benefit of effort, and effort decreases (Alary et al. (2013)).10 Snow (2011) assumes that
effort has a multiplicative effect on beliefs, which implies that it is more effective for
pessimistic beliefs (high probabilities of harm). As a result, in his model ambiguity
increases the self-protection effort. My model is consistent with both insights.11
1 Uncertainty aversion
Let us consider the case in which an injurer (I) can cause harm h to a victim (V).
Assume first that the probability of harm is pi (x) , where x is the level of care taken
by the injurer and pi (x) is common knowledge. Liability law determines whether the
victim is entitled to recover damages from the injurer. Let us assume, for the time
being, that damages d are awarded. The victims bears loss h− d in case of accident.
The expected utility of the victim, given the probability of harm pi (x) , is
EUpi(x) = (1− pi (x))u (iV ) + pi (x)u (iV − (h− d)) ,
where iV is his income.
If we take a second order approximation of the utility function, we obtain an ex-
pression for the payoff of victim that depends only on the mean and the variance of
the loss prospect. The certainty equivalent cpi(x) of the accident prospect (such that
10A related result, applied to optimal pollution abatement, is obtained by Millner et al. (2013).
11Berger et al. (2013) show that a patient’s propensity to opt for treatment increases with (smooth)
ambiguity if ambiguity regards the diagnosis, while it decreases with ambiguity if ambiguity regards
the effects of treatment. This pattern is explained by the fact that ambiguity averse individuals tend
to overweight the bad states of the world.
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u
(
cpi(x)
)
= EUpi(x)) can be written as:
cpi(x) = iV − pi (x) (h− d)− 12ρV σ2pi(x) (h− d)2 , (1)
where pi (x) (h− d) is the expected loss, σ2pi(x) = pi (x) (1− pi (x)) the variance of the
unit loss, and ρV the Arrow-Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion of the victim (see
Pratt (1964)).
Suppose now that the probability of harm is uncertain: the victim formulates be-
liefs about pi (x) . Let µV be the probability distribution over beliefs pi (x). The more
dispersed the beliefs, and the higher the ambiguity.
Figure 1 illustrates the case in which two (equally plausible) models of individual
dose-response to an environmental chemical are available. Under model A the “safety
threshold” is xA, while under model B it is xB (here care reduces the exposition to the
chemical).12
Fig. 1. Dose response uncertainty.
12See the recent report of the NRC (National-Research-Council (2009)) for the extensive implications
of scientific uncertainty, including dose response, on risk assessment.
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For intermediate levels of care, ambiguity is high.13 Given the level of care x0, for in-
stance, the probability of harm is piA under the first model and piB under the second
model. Under Expected Utility theory, the distribution of the beliefs is irrelevant: the
only thing that matters is the mean probability of harm: p (x) = Eµ (pi (x)) . This cor-
responds to the case of an ambiguity-neutral agent. Ambiguity-averse agents, instead,
tend to dislike choice environments where probabilities are not known for sure (they
are averse to mean preserving spreads of the beliefs). Instead of maximizing the simple
mean of the Expected Utilities associated to the different beliefs, they maximize the
mean of a concave transformation ϕ of the expected utilities. Fig. 2 illustrates.
Fig. 2. Ambiguity aversion.
Given x0, under model A, the agent gets Expected Utility EU (piA) , while under
model B he gets EU (piB) . Aversion to ambiguity is captured by the curvature of the ϕ
function: the welfare the agent obtains from this ambiguous situation, Eµ (ϕ (EU (pi))) ,
13In this example, the relationship between care and ambiguity (dispersion of beliefs) is non-
monotonic. In what follows, I make no specific assumptions of the shape of this relationship, although
some results only apply if ambiguity decreases with care.
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is less than the welfare he would get if the probability of harm were p (x) for sure,
ϕ (EU (p (x))) . Note how the smooth model (differently from most non-EU models)
allows for a clear distinction between risk aversion (the curvature of the utility function),
ambiguity (the dispersion of the beliefs), and ambiguity aversion (the curvature of the
transformation function).14
By applying a second order approximation to the transformation function ϕ, I obtain
an original mean-variance model (see Appendix A1), in which the certainty equivalent
for the victim can be written as
CV (x) = iV − p (x) (h− d)− 12ΨV (x) (h− d)2 . (2)
The uncertainty premium has a simple shape:
1
2
ΨV (x) (h− d)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty premium
= 1
2
ρV σ
2
p(x) (h− d)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
+ 1
2
θV σ
2
µV
(pi (x)) (h− d)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity premium
. (3)
The uncertainty premium is equal to the sum of the risk and ambiguity premia. The risk
premium is one half of the degree of risk aversion ρV times the variance generated by
the mean probability of harm times the square of the loss. The ambiguity premium
is one half of the agent’s degree of ambiguity aversion θV times the variance of the prior
beliefs times the square of the loss. The uncertainty index:
ΨV (x) = ρV σ
2
p(x) + θV σ
2
µV
(pi (x)) (4)
is thus a local measure of the costs of risk and ambiguity for the victim. It depends on
two taste parameters (ρV and θV ) and two uncertainty measures (σ
2
p(x) and σ
2
µV
(pi (x)) .
Note that the uncertainty premium smoothly converges to zero as the loss goes to zero
(henceforth the name “smooth model”).
In the following, I will assume that the victim (as the injurer) is neither risk nor
14If the agent is infinitely averse to ambiguity, he behaves as if the probability of harm were the
largest among the possible ones (in his beliefs set), in line with the Maximin Expected Utility of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989).
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ambiguity lover: ρV ≥ 0, θV ≥ 0.15 Results can be easily adapted to the opposite case.
Before turning to the injurer, I need to make some assumptions on the structure of
the beliefs. The injurer and the victim can have different priors about the probability of
harms pi (x). I assume, however, that these priors share (at least) the same mean p (x):
parties formulate unbiased estimates of the probability of harm. In this sense, harm
is “foreseeable.”16 A more radical departure from the traditional theory is represented
by the case in which parties do not agree on the mean probability of harm and have,
therefore, diverging expectations. The latter case is analyzed in Appendix A6.
Assumption 1 Foreseeability. For all levels of care x ≥ 0, the beliefs of the injurer
and the victim are correct on average: EµI (pi (x)) = EµV (pi (x)) ≡ p (x) .
The beliefs of the parties can be characterized by different levels of ambiguity. As
the ambiguity drops to zero, the model converges to the standard EU model, in which
p (x) is regarded as the “true” harm probability.17
Care is assumed to reduce the mean probability of harm at a decreasing rate. To
better disentangle the effect of risk aversion, I further assume that the mean probability
of harm is not too large.
Assumption 2 For any level of care: p (x) ≤ 1/2, p′ (x) < 0, and p′′ (x) > 0.
The variance of the unit loss generated by the mean probability of harm is σ2p(x) =
p (x) (1− p (x)) . This variance decreases with x if Assumption 2 is met.18
15From auto collision insurance choices of households, the following baseline estimates of the absolute
risk aversion index have been optained: ρ ∈ [0.002, 0.008] (Barseghyan et al. (2013)), ρ ' 0.0067 (Cohen
and Einav (2007)), and ρ ∈ [0.002, 0.0053] (Sydnor (2010)). Conte and Hey (2013) and Attanasi et al.
(2014) provide experimental estimates of the smooth model.
16Foreseeability of risks is a common requisite for liability to apply (at least after Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, N.J. 1984). See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm
§3, 2005. This paper does not address scientifically unknowable risks. Additionally, because the
information set does not chance with time, it does not consider hindsight liability. On the latter, see
Ben-Shahar (1998),
17To rationalize: when the evidence on harm is scarce or is conflicting, beliefs will be characterized
by ambiguity. Here, p (x) is just the mean belief. As the evidence accumulates, ambiguity disappears
and p (x) emerges as the “objective” probability of harm, known to all parties.
18Assumption 2 is stronger than necessary. What I really need is that the mean probability of harm
is not greater than 1/2 in equilibrium. Conducts yielding an equilibrium probability of harm greater
than 1/2 would probably qualify as reckless and wanton. They lie outside the scope of this paper.
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Let us now consider the injurer, on the assumption that she pays damages d when
an accident occurs. Her certainty equivalent can be written as:
CI (x) = iI − x− p (x) d− 12ΨI (x) d2, (5)
where iI is her income, x the expenditure in care, and ΨI (x) her uncertainty index:
ΨI (x) = ρI σ
2
p(x) + θI σ
2
µI
(pij (x)) . (6)
Again, the uncertainty index includes a risk aversion component (index of risk aversion
ρI times the variance of the mean probability of harm) and an ambiguity aversion
component (index of ambiguity aversion θI times the variance of her beliefs).
As the injurer invests more in care x, the expected liability payment p (x) d decreases,
the risk premium 1
2
ρI σ
2
p(x) d
2 decreases, while the ambiguity premium can increase or
decrease, depending on whether care increases or decreases the uncertainty regarding
the probability of harm.
2 Optimal liability design
2.1 Strict liability
Under Strict Liability, the injurer pays compensation to the victim irrespective of the
amount x invested in precaution. Courts can affect the injurer’s behavior and the
allocation of uncertainty by means of the damages awarded d. Damages can fully
compensate the victim (d = h), they can overcompensate him, e.g., by including a
punitive component, or they can under-compensate him, e.g., when caps are imposed
or when some types of harm are deliberately excluded (e.g., pain and suffering).
The optimal level of d is obtained from the maximization of Social Welfare
SW SL = CI (x0) + CV (x0)
= iI − x0 − p (x0) d− 12ΨI (x0) d2 + iV − p (x0) (h− d)− 12ΨI (x0) d2,
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Since iI , iV , and h are constants, the problem is equivalent to the minimization of Social
Loss:
minLSL (d) = x0 + p (x0)h+
1
2
ΨI (x0) d
2 + 1
2
ΨV (x0) (h− d)2 . (7)
The care level x0 is chosen by the injurer so as to maximize her certainty equivalent
CI (x). She will set x0 so that
1 = − p′ (x0) d− 12Ψ′I (x0) d2 : (8)
an additional dollar spent in precaution reduces her expected liability and her uncer-
tainty premium by one dollar.
We have:
Ψ′I (x) = ρI
dσ2
p(x)
dx
+ θI
dσ2µI
(pij(x))
dx
= ρI p
′ (x) (1− 2p (x)) + θI ∂σ
2
µI
(pi(x))
∂x
, (9)
an increase in care reduces the variance of the mean probability of harm p (x) (thanks
to Assumption 2) and affects the level of ambiguity borne by the injurer. If care does
not increase the variance of her prior,
∂σ2µI
(pij(x))
∂x
≤ 0, then: Ψ′I (x) < 0.
From (9) and (8), we get that incentives to take care increase with the index of risk
aversion ρI , while they increase with the index of ambiguity aversion θI if, and only if,
∂σ2µI
(pij(x))
∂x
< 0.
Care increases with damages d if, and only if, the following condition holds:
p′ (x0) + Ψ′I (x0) d < 0, (10)
Condition (10) posits that care can increase ambiguity, but not too much.19 In what
follows, I will assume that condition (10) is met for all levels of d. This condition is
surely met when care does not increase ambiguity:
∂σ2µI
(pi(x))
∂x
≤ 0.
19Eq. 10 can be written as θI
∂σ2µI
∂x < −p′
[
1
d + (1− 2p) ρI
]
. It is met if −p′ is sufficiently large (care
reduces substantially the mean probability of harm), θI is small, ρI is large and
∂σ2µI
∂x is small.
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By differentiation of (7) , using (8), we get:
LSL ′ (d) =
∂x0
∂d
[
p′ (x0) (h− d) + 12Ψ′V (x0) (h− d)2
]
+ ΨI (x0) d−ΨV (x0) (h− d) .
(11)
An increase in damages has two effects: i) it provides the injurer with additional in-
centives to take care and hence to reduce the “externality” she exerts on the victim
(uncompensated harm and the attendant uncertainty premium), and ii) it shifts the
uncertainty burden from the victim to the injurer.
By implicit differentiation of (11), we get: ∂d
∗
∂ρV
> 0. Furthermore, if
∂σ2µV
(x0)
∂x
≤ 0,
then ∂d
∗
∂θV
> 0.
Note that for d = h, the “externality” effect vanishes and marginal social loss
collapses to
LSL′ (h) = ΨI (x0) h ≥ 0.
With fully compensatory damages (d = h) , incentives to take care would be appropri-
ately set, since the injurer fully internalizes the consequences of her actions. However,
the uncertainty would not be optimally allocated, since all of the burden would be
placed on the injurer. If the injurer is not uncertainty neutral (i.e., if ΨI (x0) > 0), the
allocation of uncertainty can be improved at the margin - with a negligible effect on
the welfare of the victim - by reducing damages and shifting some of the uncertainty
on the victim. The benefit for the injurer is of the first order, the cost for the victim of
the second order.
Proposition 1 Strict liability. If the injurer is not uncertainty neutral, damages should
be less than fully compensatory: d∗ < h. Optimal damages increase with the index of
risk aversion of the victim, ρV , while they increase with his index of ambiguity aversion,
θV , if care reduces the variance of his priors.
Under Strict Liability, courts control the level of the damages awarded. Using this
tool, they should try and achieve two goals: i) provide incentives to take care, and
ii) allocate the uncertainty burden. The first goal would be accomplished if damages
were set equal to harm. This outcome, however, is not optimal in terms of uncertainty
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allocation, unless the injurer is uncertainty neutral. Thus, damages should leave a share
of the loss on the victim.20
The impact of ambiguity on the optimal level of damages is not univocal. If the
victim is subject to large ambiguity, a shift of the loss on the injurer might look desirable.
However, if the injurer bears a larger share of the loss, she will take greater care. In
turn, this might further increase the ambiguity borne by the victim (if the variance of
his beliefs increases with x).
2.2 Negligence
Under a Negligence rule, the injurer pays compensatory damages d = h only if she does
not meet the due standard of care x¯. Care is assumed to be verifiable in court. Unless
the standard is prohibitively high, the injurer will prefer to meet it and avoid liability.
I will thus assume that x = x¯.21 The optimal standard should be set so as to minimize
LN (x¯) = x¯+ p (x¯)h+ 1
2
ΨV (x¯)h
2. (12)
All the uncertainty is borne by the victim.
The optimal standard x¯ should solve:
1 = −p′ (x¯)h− 1
2
Ψ′V (x¯)h
2 : (13)
an additional dollar spent on precaution should reduce expected harm and the uncer-
tainty premia of the victim by one dollar.
We get ∂x¯
∂h
> 0 if, and only if: p′ (x¯) + Ψ′V (x¯)h < 0, which is assumed to hold.
22
20In this model, the Injurer cannot escape responsibility. Thus, the standard rationale for punitive
damages does not apply.
21The injurer prefers to be negligent if x¯ > x∗ + p (x∗)h+ 12ΨI (x
∗)h2, where x∗ maximises in-
jurer’s welfare when she is liable. If that is the case, however, then x¯+p (x¯)h +ΨV (x¯)h
2 > x∗+
p (x∗)h+ 12ΨI (x
∗)h2, and the lawmaker itself would definitely prefer that the injurer did not meet the
standard. The results of this paper also hold if damages (paid by the negligent injurer) differ from
harm. However, damages cannot be too low, as otherwise the injurer prefers not to meet the standard
and strict liability de facto applies.
22This assumption is the equivalent of Condition (10) applied to the Injurer.
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From (4) and Assumption 2, by implicit differentiation, we get: ∂x¯
∂ρV
> 0. Furthermore,
∂x¯
∂θV
> 0 if, and only if:
∂σ2µV
(pi(x¯))
∂x
< 0. Hence, the following.
Proposition 2 The optimal standard of care increases with the degree of risk aversion
of the victim, ρV . It increases with his degree of ambiguity aversion, θV , if, and only if,
care reduces the variance of his prior.
The latter result identifies the condition under which ambiguity supports a cau-
tionary approach to liability law: uncertainty about the probability of harm calls for
a tighter safety standard if, and only if, care reduces the variance of the beliefs of the
victim. While ambiguity surely increases the victim’s uncertainty premium, one cannot
say a priori whether ambiguity calls for greater prevention effort.
The optimal standard of care is obtained by balancing different (potentially con-
flicting) factors: costs of prevention effort (x), effectiveness of this effort to reduce the
mean probability of harm (p′ (x)), ability of this effort to reduce the uncertainty borne
by the potential victim (impact on σ2p(x) and σ
2
µV
(pi (x)) . If
∂σ2µV
(pi(x))
∂x
> 0, the safest
prevention measures turn out to be the less reliable ones: they reduce the mean prob-
ability of harm but increase the ambiguity borne by the victims. If victims are highly
averse to ambiguity, the use of these measures should be discouraged.
2.3 Strict liability vs. Negligence
Both Negligence and Strict Liability provide second best solutions to the concomitant
problems of optimal uncertainty allocation and harm prevention. Which rule is prefer-
able? Under Negligence, the uncertainty is fully placed on the victim and the standard
of care is (optimally) set by the courts. Under Strict Liability, uncertainty is shared at
the optimum, and the level of care is chosen by the injurer.
To compare Strict Liability and Negligence, let us start from the special case in
which damages are equal to harm: d = h. Here, constrained social loss amounts to:
L̂SL (xc) = xc + p (xc)h+ 1
2
ΨI (x
c) h2, (14)
where xc is the level of care chosen by the injurer (eq. 8).
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For any given level of care x, constrained Strict Liability (14) yields a lower ex-post
social loss than Negligence (eq. 12) if, and only if:
L̂SL (x) < LN (x)⇔ ΨI (x) < ΨV (x) . (15)
Given x, a rule placing the whole loss on the injurer is preferable to a rule placing
it entirely on the victim if, and only if, the former is less averse to uncertainty than the
latter. The following sharp conditions point to the best uncertainty bearers:
Condition I : for all x, ΨI (x) ≤ ΨV (x) ,
Condition V : for all x, ΨI (x) > ΨV (x) .
Under Condition I, for all levels of care, the injurer is the best uncertainty bearer.
Under Condition V, the victim is the best uncertainty bearer.
Let us suppose that Condition I holds: given the optimal level of care under Neg-
ligence xn, Strict Liability with compensatory damages is preferable to Negligence:
L̂SL (xn) ≤ LN (xn) . Social loss is even lower, under constrained Strict Liability, if the
injurer is free to chose the level of care xc that maximizes her welfare (the welfare
level of the victims is not affected): L̂SL (xc) ≤ L̂SL (xn). Social loss further declines
if damages are optimally set: LSL (x0) < L̂
SL (xc) , where x0 is the level of care taken
by the injurer when d = d∗ < h. Thus, if Condition I holds, Strict Liability dominates
Negligence.
Let us suppose now that Condition V holds. Given the level of care xc chosen by the
injurer under Strict Liability with compensatory damages, Negligence entails a lower
social loss: LN (xc) < L̂SL (xc). Social loss further decreases, under Negligence, if the
level of care is optimally chosen by the courts: LN (xn) ≤ LN (xc) . We have thus proved
the following:
Proposition 3 Strict liability vs. Negligence.
i) if Condition I holds, Strict Liability dominates Negligence.
ii) If Condition V holds, Negligence dominates Strict Liability when damages are
fully compensatory (d = h).
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Proposition 3 identifies some clear cut conditions for the choice between liability
rules. These conditions are based on the ability of the parties to tolerate uncertainty.
In turn, this ability depends on their degrees of aversion to risk and ambiguity, and on
the dispersion of their beliefs.23 The result, however, is not symmetric: when courts
can suitable chose the level of damages, Condition V is not enough to guarantee that
Negligence is preferable. Dominance of Negligence can only be obtained under stronger
conditions.
From (12) and (7) , one can see that
LN (xs) < LS (xs)⇔ ΨV (xs)h2 < ΨI (xs) d∗2 + ΨV (xs) (h− d∗)2 ,
where xs is the care level chosen by the injurer under Strict Liability, which simplifies
to
LN (xs) < LS (xs)⇔ d
∗
h
> 2
ΨV (x
s)
ΨV (xs) + ΨI (xs)
. (16)
Since d∗ < h, inequality (16) can be met only if ΨV (xs) < ΨI (xs).
Note that ΨV (x
s)
ΨV (xs)+ΨI(xs)
converges to zero if ΨV (x
s) becomes small, while optimal
damages d∗ do not (the injurer needs to be motivated, see Appendix A3). Thus, in-
equality (16) is met if ρV and θV are both sufficiently small. If this is the case, then
LN (xn) ≤ LN (xs) < LS (xs) ,
where xn is the optimal level of care chosen by the courts: Negligence dominates Strict
Liability.
Proposition 4 When damages are optimally set by the courts, Negligence dominates
Strict Liability if the degrees of risk and ambiguity aversion of the victim are sufficiently
small.
Also for this Proposition, note that the condition used is sufficient but not necessary.
23If σ2µV (pi (x)) and σ
2
µI (pi (x)) are affected in different ways by x, one can have situations in which
neither Condition I nor V hold (the victim might be the best uncertainty bearers for some levels of x,
but not for others). Note, however, that dominance of strict liability only requires: ΨI (x
n) < ΨV (x
n) .
Dominance of negligence only requires: ΨI (x0) > ΨV (x0) .
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3 Bilateral accidents
In this section, I touch upon the case in which the victim can affect his likelihood of
suffering harm. For instance, by wearing protective clothes, an individual can reduce
the risk of burn injuries.
I concentrate on two liability rules: simple Negligence and Strict Liability with
the defence of contributory negligence. The latter defence is necessary to provide the
victim with incentives to take care (see Shavell (2007)).
Both liability rules are able to provide incentives to take care (the analysis is pro-
vided in Appendix A4). Under Strict Liability with contributory negligence, the injurer
selects care so as to minimize the difference between his liability burden and the cost
of care; the victim takes care so as to avoid liability. Optimal damages are under-
compensatory. Under Negligence, the injurer meets the standard of care; the victim
selects care so as to minimize the difference between the burden of harm and the cost
of care. The optimal standard of care for the injurer increases with the degree of risk
aversion of the victim, while it increases with the degree of ambiguity aversion of the
latter if care (of both sides) reduces the variance of the prior of the victim (on the
assumption that cross-effects do not go in the opposite direction or that they are small
enough).
In the comparison between liability rules, Propositions 3 and 4 apply. Thus,
Strict liability with the defence of contributory negligence is preferable, if the victim is
at least as averse to uncertainty as the injurer. Negligence is preferable if the victim’s
aversion to uncertainty is weak enough.
4 Dispersed harm
Let us consider the case in which victims are numerous. For simplicity, I posit that all
n victims are alike: they all suffer harm h, and they are all equally averse to risk and
ambiguity: for all j = {1, 2, ..., n} and for all x ≥ 0, ΨV j (x) = ΨV (x) . Let total harm
be nh = H; total damages nd = D.
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Social loss under Strict Liability can now be written as (omitting arguments):
LSL = x0 + pnh+
1
2
ΨI (nd)
2 + n 1
2
ΨV (h− d)2 =
= x0 + pH +
1
2
ΨI D
2 + 1
2
ΨV
n
(H −D)2 ,
where x0 is chosen by the injurer (so we are back to the case in which only the injurer
takes care, but this is immaterial).
Under Negligence we have instead
LN (x¯) = x¯+ p (x¯)nh+ n1
2
ΨV (x¯)h
2 = x¯+ p (x¯)H + 1
2
ΨV
n
(x¯)H2.
The loss functions are equivalent to the loss functions of the basic problem, but now
the victim’s degree of uncertainty aversion is divided by n. So, if if n is sufficiently large,
the (equivalent of) both Condition V and inequality (16) are met. Hence, Proposition
3, part ii), as well as Proposition 4 apply.
Proposition 5 If the number of victims is sufficiently large, Negligence dominates
Strict Liability.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Since the Uncertainty Premium
increases more than proportionally with the loss, the loss should not be entirely placed
on the injurer. A liability rule spreading uncertainty tends to be preferable, as originally
argued by Nell and Richter (2003) with respect to standard risk.24
5 Final remarks
This paper sheds light on the optimal structure of liability law in an uncertain world in
which the activity of the injurer generates both risk and ambiguity. Since most people
24Nell and Richter (2003) prove that, if care is bounded above, then negligence is approximately
first best efficient for n → ∞ (see Appendix A5). Without restricting x, I identify the condition
for the superiority of negligence both for unilateral and bilateral accidents under risk and ambiguity.
Proposition 5 holds also for finite levels of total harm H.
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are risk and ambiguity averse, the inclusion of uncertainty substantially adds to the
realism of the analysis. There are good reasons to believe that for toxic torts and newly
developed technologies, the ambiguity component of uncertainty is likely to be by far
the most important.
In a first best world, in which the policy maker could control both the amount of care
taken by individuals and the share of the loss borne by each one (de facto, a system with
regulation and social insurance), each agent would exert care up to the point in which
one dollar spent in precaution reduces expected harm and the uncertainty burden by
one dollar. The loss would be distributed in proportion to the tolerance to uncertainty
of each individual (Appendix A5). Standard liability rules cannot mimic this outcome
and are therefore bound to be (first best) inefficient.
Under Strict Liability, courts should set damages so as to simultaneously provide
incentives to take care and reduce the uncertainty burden for the parties. If greater
care induces both a reduction in the mean probability of harm and in the ambiguity
perceived by the victim, then optimal damages increase with the degrees of risk and
ambiguity aversion of the victim. If the victim is very sensitive to uncertainty, damages
should get close to the full extent of the harm suffered. They will however fall short of
full compensation, as some uncertainty sharing is always optimal.
Under Negligence, the optimal standard should balance benefits and costs of pre-
vention. The benefits are calculated on the basis of the effect of prevention on safety
and uncertainty. A measure that improves safety (in expected terms) might increase
uncertainty: if that is the case, then mean safety should be traded off, at the margin,
against the predictability/accuracy of prevention.25
Since both Strict Liability and Negligence can effectively provide incentives to take
care, the comparison between the two hinges on their ability to suitably allocate the
uncertainty burden between the parties. Depending on their ability to tolerate risk and
25In the special case in which negligence centers around whether the use of a potentially toxic
substance should be allowed or prohibited, uncertainty aversion marginally shifts the balance in favour
of prohibition, in line with Comment c, “Toxic substances and disease” Restatement (Third) of Torts, §
28 (which suggests that scientific uncertainty might call for a cautionary approach in the determination
of the toxicity of chemical agents).
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ambiguity, one of the parties can have a comparative advantage in this respect. My
model provides for a clear-cut identification of the best uncertainty bearer: the party
that has the smallest uncertainty index is the best bearer (this index can be modified
to include optimism/pessimism attitudes, as discussed in Appendix A6).
An important point made in this paper is that Strict Liability and Negligence are
symmetric in their ability to allocate uncertainty only if damages (under Strict Liabil-
ity) are fully compensatory. If they are not, i.e. if courts can under-compensate the
victim, then Strict Liability is marginally superior to Negligence: if the injurer and the
victim are equally good uncertainty bearers, then Strict Liability dominates (as it can
shift some of the burden on the injurer). Negligence dominates only if the victim is
substantially more averse to uncertainty than the injurer or if harm is distributed on
many victims.
The policy implications of my results are quite clear. Uncertainty aversion affects
both the determination of the optimal standard and the optimal allocation of the loss.
As such, it provides an additional criterion for the choice between liability rules.
The assessment of the impact of uncertainty of harm on the welfare of the parties,
however, is not an easy task. Estimates about the degree of risk aversion of typical
households have been obtained from insurance data (see footnote 15). The size of the
epistemic uncertainty associated with different hazards has been the object of through
investigations. Extensive research by social psychologists shows that “knowability” is a
fundamental dimension of risk perception (see, for instance, Slovic (2000)). Individual
responses to epistemic uncertainty, however, can vary.
For harms related to product’s defects and environmental hazards, one might argue
that the cost of uncertainty is likely to be larger if it falls on the victims rather than
on big firms and manufacturers, which might rely on more precise estimates of the
probability of harm and might have better chances to get insurance (and thus improve
their tolerance to uncertainty). So, strict liability for products-related harms and for
environmental harms might be preferable - in line with the current legal system. This
insight, however, has to be balanced against the observation that, for dispersed harms,
negligence allows for better uncertainty spreading.
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Note how my arguments in favor or against the Negligence rule differ from those of
Teitelbaum (2007). In my view, risk and ambiguity are the basic dimensions of uncer-
tainty: both contribute to the social cost of accidents. For Teitelbaum, ambiguity is
close to a perception error that needs to be corrected by the legal system (by means of
technical standards). The ambiguity of my model, instead, results from the difficulty
- sometimes impossibility - of calculating objective probabilities. The cost of this un-
certainty cannot be eliminated: the party that bears the loss inevitably also bears the
cost of uncertainty.
The mean-variance model developed in this paper abstracts away from income ef-
fects, which is a special blessing for welfare analysis. One purpose of this paper is to
illustrate how traditional cost-benefit analysis can be enriched to take account of such
important factors like risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. The tools for this exten-
sion are relatively handy and can be applied to many other legal settings, including
litigation and contract law.
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6 Appendix
A1. Mean-Variance approximation. Given the investment in care x, let µ be the probability
distribution describing the agent’s beliefs about the probability of harm pi (x). These prob-
abilities can belong to an interval or a discrete set. For any probability pi (x) , the expected
utility of the agent is: EUpi(x) = (1− pi (x))u (i) + pi (x)u (i− `) , where i is her net income
and ` the loss. The welfare functional is
W = Eµ
(
ϕ
(
EUpi(x)
))
, (17)
where Eµ is the expectation over the prior distribution of pi (x) , and ϕ a function capturing
the agent’s attitude towards ambiguity.
If ϕ is linear, the maximization of W is equivalent to the maximization of
W = Eµ
(
EUpi(x)
)
= (1− Eµ (pi (x)))u (i) + Eµ (pi (x)) u (i− `) = EUp(x),
where p (x) = Eµ (pi (x)) is the mean of the possible probabilities of harm (those belonging
to the prior set). In this case, the agent behaves like an Expected Utility maximizer: she
only cares about the reduced probability p (x) of the compound lottery, and is said to be
“ambiguity neutral.”
If ϕ is concave, the agent is averse to mean preserving spreads of the beliefs:
Eµ
(
ϕ
(
EUpi(x)
))
< ϕ
(
Eµ
(
EUpi(x)
))
.
For any probability pi (x) , the certainty equivalent of the harm lottery (such that u
(
cpi(x)
)
=
EUpi(x)) can be written as:
cpi(x) = i− pi (x) `− 12ρσ2pi(x)`2 + o
(
`2
)
, (18)
where pi (x) ` is the expected loss, σ2pi(x) = pi (x) (1− pi (x)) the variance of the unit loss, ρ the
Arrow-Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion of the utility function, and o
(
`2
)
an expression
that includes terms of third and higher order. If the loss is small or if u′′′ is close to zero, the
last term can be neglected.
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If we let
wpi(x) = pi (x) +
1
2ρ σ
2
pi(x) `, (19)
the certainty equivalent becomes: cpi(x) ' i − ` wpi(x), where wpi(x) is a random variable that
depends on pi (x) . Let v (i) = ϕ (u (i)) . Thus, we can write the welfare functional as26
W = Eµ
(
v
(
cpi(x)
))
.
By using a second order expansion, we get an approximation for the total certainty equivalent
C (x) , with v (C (x)) = Eµ
(
v
(
cpi(x)
))
, which takes into account the uncertainty over wpi(x):
C (x) = i− ` Eµ
(
wpi(x)
)− 12λv`2 σ2µ (wpi(x))+ o (`2) ,
where λv = −v
′′(i−` Eµ(wpi(x)))
v′(i−` Eµ(wpi(x)))
is the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion of the v
function. From eq. (19) , we get
Eµ
(
wpi(x)
)
= p (x) + 12ρ ` Eµ
(
σ2pi(x)
)
,
where p (x) = Eµ (pi (x)) is the mean probability of harm, and
σ2µ
(
wpi(x)
)
= σ2µ (pi (x)) + σ
2
µ
(
1
2ρ σ
2
pi(x)`
)
+ 2Cov
(
pi (x) , 12ρσ
2
pi(x)`
)
.
Thus (omitting the argument of pi (x)),
C (x) =
i− ` [p (x) + 12ρ`Eµ (σ2pi)]− 12λv`2 [σ2µ (pi) + (12ρ`)2 σ2µ (σ2pi)+ ρ`Cov (pi, σ2pi)]+ o (`2) =
i− p (x) `− 12ρ`2Eµ
(
σ2pi
)− 12λv`2σ2µ (pi)− `4 (12ρ)2 σ2µ (σ2pi)− 12λvρ`3Cov (pi, σ2pi)+ o (`2) =
i− p (x) `− 12ρ`2Eµ
(
σ2pi
)− 12λv`2σ2µ (pi) + o (`2) .
The total uncertainty equivalent is thus approximately equal to: i) income less the expected
loss, ii) less the mean of the Arrow-Pratt risk premium, iii) less a term which depends on the
26I am grateful to Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci for providing the steps needed
to reconcile my approximation to their general result (presented in Maccheroni et al. (2013),
Appendix A1). My approximation applies to unilateral risks, theirs to symmetric risks. Re-
lated approximations are obtained by Jewitt and Mukerji (2011) and Izhakian and Benninga
(2011)
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variance of the belief.
Since v (i) = ϕ (u (i)) and v
′′
v′ =
ϕ′′
ϕ′ +
u′′
u′ , we get λv = θ+ρ, with θ= −ϕ
′′
ϕ′ . Hence, omitting
third and higher order terms:
C (x) ' i− p (x) `− 12ρ `2 Eµ
(
σ2pi(x)
)
− 12 [θ + ρ ] `2 σ2µ (pi (x))
' i− p (x) `− 12ρ`2
[
Eµ
(
σ2pi(x)
)
+ σ2µ (pi (x))
]
− 12θ `2σ2µ (pi (x)) .
Note that
Eµ
(
σ2pi(x)
)
= Eµ (pi (x) (1− pi (x)))
= p (x)− Eµ
(
pi (x)2
)
= p (x)−
[
σ2µ (pi (x)) + p (x)
2
]
= p (x) (1− p (x))− σ2µ (pi (x)) = σ2p(x) − σ2µ (pi (x)) .
Thus,
C (x) ' i− p (x) `− 12 ρ σ2p(x)`2 − 12θ σ2µ (pi (x)) `2.
Under ambiguity aversion, the certainty equivalent is equal to income less expected loss less
the risk premium attendant with the mean probability p (x) , less an ambiguity premium
which depends on the variance of the beliefs σ2µ (pi (x)) . The uncertainty premium UP (x) =
Eµ (pi (x) `)− C (x) is therefore:
UP (x) = 12 ρ σ
2
p(x) `
2 + 12 θ σ
2
µ (pi (x)) `
2 ≡ 12Ψ (x) `2. (20)
The uncertainty premium is equal to the sum of the risk and ambiguity premia.
A2. Comparative statics under Negligence. From eq. (13) , we get
f (x¯) = 1 + p′ (x¯)
(
H + (1− 2p (x¯)) 1
2
H2 ρV
)
+
1
2
θV H
2
∂σ2µV (x)
∂x
= 0.
We have
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sign
(
∂x¯
∂ρV
)
= sign
(
−∂
2L (x¯)
∂x¯ ∂ρV
/
∂2L (x¯)
∂x¯2
)
= sign
(
−p′ (x¯) (1− 2p (x¯)) 1
2
H2 ρV
)
,
sign
(
∂x¯
∂θV
)
= sign
(
−∂
2L (x¯)
∂x¯ ∂θV
/
∂2L (x¯)
∂x¯2
)
= sign
(
∂σ2µV (x)
∂x
)
Thus, ∂x¯∂ρV > 0 thanks to Assumption 2, and
∂x¯
∂θV
< 0 if, and only if,
∂σ2µV
(x)
∂x < 0.
A3. Strict Liability vs. Negligence. We have LN (xs) < LS (xs) if, and only if (omitting
arguments):
d∗
h
>
2 ΨV
ΨI + ΨV
. (21)
If the victim is risk and ambiguity neutral (ρV → 0, θV → 0), we have, from eq. (11)
LS′ =
∂x◦
∂d
p′ (h− d) + d [p (1− p) ρI + θI σ2µI ] . (22)
For d→ 0, we get
LS′ (0) =
∂x◦
∂d
p′xh < 0 :
optimal damages d∗ do not drop to zero when the victim is uncertainty neutral. Thus, d
∗
h is
surely greater than 2 ΨVΨI+ΨV if ΨV sufficiently small. This proves Proposition 4.
A4. Bilateral accidents. Negligence. Let x¯ be the due level of care for the injurer and y the
level of care taken by the victim. If the injurer meets the standard of care (as I assume), the
victim will chose the level of care that maximizes his certainty equivalent
CV = iV − y − p (x¯, )h− 12p (x¯, y) [1− p (x¯, y)]h2ρV − 12θV σ2µV (pi (x¯, y))h2.
Thus, he will chose y = ŷ so that
1 + p′y (x¯, ŷ)
(
h+ 12 (1− 2p (x¯, ŷ))h2ρV
)
+ 12θV
∂σ2µV (pi (x¯, ŷ))
∂y
h2 = 0. (23)
Social loss is:
LN (x¯) = x¯+ yˆ + p (x¯, ŷ)h+ 12ΨV (x¯, ŷ)h
2, (24)
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with
L′N (x¯) = 1 + p′x (x¯, ŷ)
(
h+ 12 (1− 2p (x¯, ŷ))h2ρV
)
+ 12θV
∂σ2µV
(pij(x¯,ŷ))
∂x h
2+
∂yˆj
∂x¯
[
1 + p′y (x¯, ŷ)
(
h+ 12 (1− 2p (x¯, ŷ))h2ρV
)
+ 12θV
∂σ2µV
(pi(x¯,ŷ))
∂y h
2
]
.
The term within square brackets is nil in view of (23).
Thus, the optimal standard of care should solve:
1 + p′x (x¯, ŷ)
(
h+
1
2
(1− 2p (x¯, ŷ))h2ρV
)
+
1
2
θV
∂σ2µV (pi (x¯, ŷ))
∂x
h2 = 0. (25)
Eq. (23) , together with (25), determine the equilibrium levels of care xN , yN , (where N
stands for Negligence). By implicit differentiation, we get (omitting arguments)
sign
[
∂xN
∂θV
]
= sign
[
∂2LN
∂y2
∂2LN
∂x∂θV
− ∂
2LN
∂x∂y
∂2LN
∂y∂θV
]
,
with ∂
2L
∂y2
≥ 0 (since this is a minimum) and
∂2LN
∂x∂y =
∂2p(x,yˆ)
∂x∂y
[
h+
1
2
(1− 2p (x, yˆ))h2ρV
]
− ∂p∂x ∂p∂yh2ρV + 12θV h2
∂2 σ2µV
(pi(x¯,yˆ))
∂x∂y ,
∂2LN
∂x∂θV
= 12h
2 ∂σ
2
µV
(pi(x¯,yˆ))
∂x , and
∂2LN
∂y∂θV
= 12h
2 ∂σ
2
µV
(pi(x¯,yˆ))
∂y .
Let us assume that ∂
2p(x¯,yˆ)
∂x∂y ≤ 0 and
∂2σ2µV
(pi(x¯,yˆ))
∂x∂y ≤ 0 : x and y are not substitutes with respect
to harm probability and ambiguity.
If
∂σ2µV
(pi(x¯,yˆ))
∂x < 0 and
∂σ2µV
(pi(x¯,yˆ))
∂y < 0, then:
∂xN
∂θV
> 0, ∂y
N
∂θV
> 0. In plain words, when
the levels of care x and y reduce the ambiguity perceived by the victims, an increase in
the victims’ degree of ambiguity aversion calls for an increase in the due level of care, on
the assumption that cross-effects do not go in the opposite direction (or that they are small
enough). Conversely, if
∂σ2µV
(pi(x¯,yˆ))
∂x > 0 and
∂σ2µV
(pi(x¯,yˆ))
∂y > 0, then:
∂xN
∂θV
< 0, ∂y
N
∂θV
< 0.
We also have: ∂x
N
∂ρV
> 0, and ∂y
N
∂ρV
> 0.
Strict liability with the defence of contributory negligence. Let us assume that damages are
such that it is in the interest of the victims to meet the due standard of care (in other words,
damages are not too low). The victim will exert care y. In turn, the injurer sets x◦ so that
1 + p′x (x
◦, y) d+ 12
∂2ΨI(x
◦,y)
∂x d
2 = 0. (26)
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If
∂σ2µI
(pi(x◦,y))
∂x < 0, then:
∂2ΨI(pi(x
◦,y))
∂x < 0 and
∂x◦
∂d > 0.
Optimal damages are obtained from the minimization of (omitting arguments):
LSL (d) = x◦ + y + p (x◦, y)h+ 12ΨI (x
◦, y) d2
+12ΨV (x
◦, y) (h− d)2 . (27)
Thus, courts will set d and y¯ so that, using (26):
∂LSL(d)
∂y¯ = 1 + p
′¯
y (x
◦, y)h+ 12
∂ΨI(x
◦,y)
∂y¯ d
2 + 12
∂ΨV (x
◦,y)
∂y¯ (h− d)2
+∂x
◦
∂y¯
[
p′x (x◦, y) (h− d) + 12 ∂ΨV (x
◦,y)
∂x◦ (h− d)2
]
= 0
∂LSL(d)
∂d = ΨI (x
◦, y) d−ΨV (x◦, y) (h− d)
+∂x
◦
∂d
[
p′x (x◦, y) (h− d) + 12 ∂ΨV (x
◦,y)
∂x◦ (h− d)2
]
= 0.
(28)
For d = h, marginal loss simplifies to
∂LSL (d)
∂d
= [1 + (n− 1) %] ΨI (x◦, y) d ≥ 0.
Thus, as in the unilateral case, at the optimum: d∗ < h if the injurer is not uncertainty
neutral.
Dominance. Let us compare Negligence and Strict Liability with fully compensatory damages
(h = d). Given care levels x and y, constrained Strict Liability is preferable if, and only if
(from 24 and 27):
L̂SL (x, y) < LN (x, y) ⇔ ΨI (x, y) < ΨV (x, y) , (29)
as in the unilateral case (see ineq. 15).
If Condition I holds, then,
L̂SL
(
xN , yN
)
< LN
(
xN , yN
)
,
where xN and yN are the levels of care taken by the parties under negligence. Social loss is
even smaller, under L̂SL, if the injurer takes the optimal level of care x◦, given the level of
care y optimally set by the courts (under Strict Liability with contributory negligence). In
fact, (x◦, y) minimizes Social Loss: if the courts could also select x, they would just pick x◦
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(this can be seen from the first order conditions). Thus,
L̂SL (x◦, y) ≤ L̂SL (xN , yN) .
If courts can optimally chose d, social loss further decreases. Thus, Strict Liability dominates
negligence.
Similarly, if Condition V holds, then,
LN (xs, ys) < LSL (xs, ys) ,
where xs, and ys are the levels of care under Strict Liability. Social loss further decreases if
courts select the socially optimal standard xN , while the victim selects his welfare maximizing
level of care yN . Again,
(
xN , yN
)
minimize social loss, even if x and y are chosen by different
subjects (see eqs. (23) and (25)). Thus, also under bilateral accidents, Propositions 3 and 4
apply.
A5. Efficient loss sharing. Let us consider the allocation that parties themselves would agree
on if they could write an ex-ante contract specifying the level of precaution to be taken by the
injurer and the way in which the loss is shared. This contract would also specify an up-front
transfer between them.27 Let us consider the case with n identical victims.
Full efficiency is obtained from the maximization of Social Welfare
SW = CI + nCV = iI − x− p (x) nd− 12ΨI (x) (nd)2 + n
[
iV − p (x) (h− d)− 12ΨI (x) d2
]
,
Since iI , iV , and h are constants, the problem is equivalent to the minimization of Social Loss:
minL = x+ p (x)nh+ 12ΨI (x) (nd)
2 + n12ΨV (x) (h− d)2 .
Social loss includes the expenditure in prevention, expected harm, and the uncertainty premia
associated with the risk of harm.
27The same transfer could be used by the policy-maker to address distributional concerns,
which are, therefore, out of the picture. See Miceli and Segerson (1995).
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From the minimization of L, we get (omitting arguments):28
∂L
∂x
= 1 + p′ (x)nh+ 12Ψ
′
I (x) (nd)
2 + n12Ψ
′
I (x) d
2 = 0, (30)
∂L
∂d
= nΨI (x) nd− nΨV (x) (h− d) = 0. (31)
The first equation determines the efficient level of care xe: one dollar spent in precaution
should reduce expected harm and the uncertainty burden of injurer and victims by one dollar.
The second equation pertains to the optimal allocation of the loss: this should be shared by
the parties according to their disposition towards uncertainty. Given the level of care, (fully)
efficient damages are therefore, from (31)
de =
ΨV (x
e)
ΨV (xe) + nΨI (xe)
h. (32)
The share of the loss borne by each party decreases with the degree of uncertainty aversion
of that party and increases with the degree of uncertainty aversion of the other party.29 If
injurer and victims were equally averse to uncertainty, ΨV (x
e) = ΨI (x
e) , then they would
split the loss in equal parts: de = 1n+1h. The injurer bears nd
e = nn+1h, while each victim
bears: h− de = nn+1h.
If n→∞, then xe goes to infinity while de goes to nil. If x is bounded above (x ≤ xmax),
then Negligence with x = xmax is approximately first best efficient, as shown by Nell and
Richter (2003) for CARA utility functions.
A6. Diverging expectations - neo-additive capacity. A substantial departure from EU theory
obtains if parties are assumed not to agree on the expected probability of harm: pI (x) 6=
pV (x) . This cases arises, for instance, when parties attach different weights to alternative
explanatory models of harm or, more generally, when they subscribe to different causation
28Here and in the rest of the paper, I assume that the mean probability of harm function,
p (x) , is convex enough to guarantee quasi-convexity of the social loss functions.
29This linear sharing rule was first obtained, for the case of simple risk aversion, by Green-
wood and Ingene (1980), p. 1061. More generally, this result implies that the loss should be
distributed on all individuals in society (not just injurer and victims), in proportion to their
ability to tolerate uncertainty. If the loss can be spread on an infinite number of individuals,
we turn to the characterization of the first best provided by Shavell (1982), which prescribes
1 + p′ (x)nh = 0 and full insurance for all risk averse parties.
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narratives. A special case is that in which each party formulates a simple belief: the injurer
believes that the probability of harm is piI (x) , the victim that it is piV (x) .
30 This case tends
to provide a straightforward policy implication: if one of the parties is (sufficiently) more
optimistic than the other, then it should bear the loss. So, if piI (x) < piV (x) for all x, Strict
Liability is preferable (both the expected loss and the risk premium borne by the injurer are
smaller than that borne by the victim under Negligence). Here, liability law allows parties to
insure each other against their own pessimistic attitudes. It is not clear, however, whether
courts would support such a solution or whether they would instead impose their own view
(a third belief) on the parties.31
If we let pI (x) 6= pV (x) in the smooth ambiguity model, a pessimism/optimism bias
is introduced. The choice between liability rules depends now on size of the uncertainty
premia (ΨV (x)−ΨI (x)) and on optimism/pessimism (pV (x)− pI (x)). Again, it is not clear
whether here courts should rely on the beliefs of the parties or on the beliefs of a “reasonable
person.”32 If the difference between pV (x) and pI (x) is large, foreseeability of harm might
fail. For example, the victim might believe that a conduct is highly dangerous while the
injurer and the court do not: the victim cannot recover because harm is not foreseeable.
An alternative view is to assume that parties share the same belief q (x) about the probabil-
ity of harm, but they interpret this probability in different ways. This approach characterizes
the “first generation” models of ambiguity aversion, pioneered by Schmeidler (1989), and
successfully applied to liability law by Teitelbaum (2007). Specifically, Teitelbaum formalizes
ambiguity along the lines of the neo-additive model of Chateauneuf et al. (2007), in which
30The diverging beliefs case has been successfully employed in the litigation literature to
explain settlement failure. See Priest and Klein (1984).
31In fact, one might argue that, here, the concept of Pareto efficiency itself becomes prob-
lematic. Gilboa et al. (2014) and Gayer et al. (2014) develop the concept of “no-betting
Pareto efficiency” (there does not exist a different allocation that makes everybody better off
according to their own beliefs and according to a belief pi, when shared by all parties). A
liability rule that allocates the loss to the party that is more pessimist - although not Pareto
efficient - might be no-betting Pareto efficient: parties might prefer that allocation if they
were to set their different beliefs aside and decide/pretend to share the same belief.
32In the words of Judge Cardozo: “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed” (Palsgraf v. Long Island, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928)). Objective probabilities, of course,
are not an option, because, if they had existed, they would have been used by the parties
themselves.
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parties distinguish only three types of events: impossible, possible, and certain. In this model,
ambiguity is defined as a lack of confidence in the probability of harm. The more severe this
lack of confidence, the further away agents move from Expected Utility by attaching greater
weight to extreme payoffs (minimum and maximum utility). Thus, agents tend to display
either pessimism or optimism, similarly to the diverging expectations model.
Since the neo-additive model is formally equivalent to the well known RDEU model (and
Cumulative Prospect Theory, under symmetric treatment of gains and losses), in what follows
I highlight two interesting implications of this approach (see Franzoni (2014) for an extensive
analysis).
First, let us consider optimal standard setting under Negligence. If victims have little
confidence in the probability of harm, they will not fully savor the benefits of greater care. In
the extreme case of complete lack of confidence, victims will regard all “possible” outcomes in
the same way (50% likely), independently of the level of care taken by the injurer. The con-
sequence of “likelihood insensitivity” is that the efficient standard will be very low (marginal
costs are savored, marginal benefits are not).33
Second. Let us consider optimal uncertainty sharing under Strict Liability. When parties
are pessimist (they attach large weight to minimum utility), very small risks (small losses) can
have a substantial impacts on their welfare. Given compensatory damages, a small reduction
of d has a first order effect on the welfare level of the victim, so it might be undesirable (while
it has a second order effect under standard risk aversion and smooth ambiguity aversion). In
particular, if the victim is substantially more pessimist than the injurer, fully compensatory
damages are optimal (d∗ = h). Neo-additive ambiguity aversion elevates uncertainty to a first
order effect - as originally suggested by Segal and Spivak (1990).
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